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In a recent article,' Erwin Chemerinsky argues that the Supreme
Court's constitutional law decisions of the 2002 Term "cannot be
explained by any overarching theory or underlying set of
interpretative principles."2 Instead, he argues, "constitutional law is
* Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. Thanks to the University of
Cincinnati, College of Law for its financial support. Sayyid Majied-Muhammad, University of
Cincinnati, College of Law Class 2005, provided excellent research assistance. I thank Peggie
Smith and the editors of this journal for their helpful comments.
1. See Erwin Chemerinsky, October Term 2002: Value Choices by the Justices, Not Theory,
Determine Constitutional Law, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 367 (2003).
2. Id. at 368.
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all about value choices made by the Justices." Professor
Chemerinsky also argues that given the current composition of the
Court, "it is the value choices of the middle" - Justice O'Connor and
Justice Kennedy - that matter the most. 4 Professor Chemerinsky
ends his article with the assertion that "[f]or better or worse, this
really is the O'Connor Court."5
In reviewing the cases decided by the Court during the 2002
Term, this article explores whether Professor Chemerinsky's
assessment of the constitutional jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
holds true in the employment law context. Unlike the situation
described by Professor Chemerinsky, when it comes to employment
law decisions, at least those involving statutory interpretation
disputes, the Court often speaks with one voice, frequently reaching
unanimous or nearly unanimous opinions. Value choices do not
appear to be driving the Justices' behavior in these cases. Instead,
employment law decisions can be explained in terms of a "text- and
rule-based" approach, most directly linked to Justice Scalia and the
conservative block of the Court. Under this approach the Court first
looks at the statute's text, interpreted in the light of "proper English"
and related statutes.! If the text of the statute is unclear, the Court
finds a rule to decide the case, and at least under Justice Scalia's
interpretation of this approach, the chosen rule should be one that
minimizes the opportunity for judicial lawmaking.' The various
statutory interpretation decisions reviewed in this article fit this
approach remarkably well and help us understand the outcome of
these cases.
"Value choices" are not completely irrelevant in describing the
employment law decisions of the Court, however. The unanimity of
voice with which the Court speaks in statutory interpretation
employment cases appears to be weaker in cases in which the Court is
called to apply common law principles,9 and in constitutional law
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 377.
6. See William D. Popkin, An "Internal Critique" of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory
Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1134 (1992).
7. Id. "Proper English" refers to the standard of what an "ideal drafter might produce, not
what everyday English users might understand." Id. at 1160.
8. Id. at 1152.
9. See discussion of Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 123 S. Ct. 1210 (2003), infra
notes 101-43 and accompanying text.
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disputes.o
II. A LESSON ON STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
In the 2002 Term, the Court decided seven cases involving the
interpretation of federal employment law related statutes.n While the
subject matter of these cases was diverse (e.g., Title VII, Americans
With Disabilities Act, Employment Retirement and Income Security
Act, Fair Labor Standards Act), the way in which the Court went
about deciding the cases was strikingly similar. This section provides
a short description of the cases, and analyzes the Court's approach to
solving these disputes.
A. The Leaders: Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas
1. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costal2
The plaintiff in Desert Palace, Catharina Costa, filed a federal
gender discrimination suit against her former employer for firing her
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1' Costa, a
warehouse worker and heavy equipment operator, was the only
woman in her job and in her local Teamsters bargaining unit.1 4 At
trial, Costa presented evidence that she had been "stalk[ed]" by a
supervisor, received harsher discipline than men for the same
conduct, was treated less favorably than men in the assignment of
overtime, and was subjected to "stack[ing]" of her disciplinary record
and sex-based slurs." The employer, however, claimed that Costa
was fired for her performance and because she was involved in a
physical altercation in a warehouse elevator with a fellow union
worker, a male.16 The district court gave a mixed-motive jury
10. See discussion of Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003),
infra notes 169-219 and accompanying text.
11. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003); Black & Decker Disability Plan v.
Nord, 123 S. Ct. 1965 (2003); Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1882 (2003);
Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 123 S. Ct. 1673 (2003); Kentucky Ass'n of Health
Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471 (2003); Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 123 S. Ct. 1210
(2003); Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149 (2002).
12. 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003).
13. Id. at 2152. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e17
(2000).
14. Desert Palace, 123 S. Ct. at 2152.
15. Id.
16. Id. Because the male worker had a clean disciplinary record, he received only a five-
day suspension.
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instruction.
The employer objected to the district court's jury instruction,
claiming that Costa had failed to adduce "direct evidence" that sex
was a motivating factor in her dismissal or in any of the other adverse
employment actions taken against her. 7 After initially agreeing with
the defendant," on rehearing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's judgment on the ground that the 1991
amendments to Title VII, impose no special evidentiary
requirement.' 9 Therefore a plaintiff may establish a violation through
a preponderance of evidence (whether direct or circumstantial) that a
protected characteristic played a "motivating factor."20 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, to address the conflict between the statutory
language and the decisions of various circuit courts, which, relying on
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in the plurality decision of
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,2' have held that direct evidence is
required to establish liability in mixed-motive cases under 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(m).22
The Court unanimously held that direct evidence of
discrimination is not required for a plaintiff to obtain a mixed-motive
instruction." In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court concluded
that to obtain such an instruction "a plaintiff need only present
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that 'race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice."' 24 The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Price Waterhouse controlled, since
17. Id. at 2152-53. At trial, the district court judge gave the jury the following mixed motive
instruction:
If you find that the plaintiff's sex was a motivating factor in the defendant's treatment
of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to your verdict, even if you find that the
defendant's conduct was also motivated by a lawful reason. [I]f you find that the
defendant's treatment of the plaintiff was motivated by both gender and lawful
reasons ... the plaintiff is entitled to damages unless the defendant proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant would have treated plaintiff
similarly even if the plaintiff's gender had played no role in the employment decision.
18. Id. at 2153.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
22. Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc. 199 F.3d 572, 582 (1st Cir. 1999); see Desert
Palace, 123 S. Ct. at 2153.
23. Id. at 2150.
24. Id. at 2155 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). Title VII makes it an "unlawful
employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual . .. because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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the 1991 amendments abrogated the references to "direct evidence." 25
More clearly than any other employment law opinion in the 2002
Term, the decision in Desert Palace reflects the Court's approach to
statutory interpretation cases. Justice Thomas began by noting that
the starting point of analysis should always be the statutory text, and
where the words of the statute are unambiguous, the judicial inquiry
is complete. 26  Because "Section 2000e-2(m) unambiguously states
that a plaintiff need only 'demonstrate[e]' that an employer used a
forbidden consideration with respect to 'any employment practice,"' a
plaintiff is not required to make a heightened showing through direct
evidence. 27 Further, Justice Thomas added, Title VII defines the term
"demonstrates" as to "mee[t] the burdens of production and
persuasion," and if Congress intended to require these burdens be
met by direct evidence it could have made that intent clear by
including language to that effect as it has done when imposing
heightened proof requirements in other circumstances.2 8
After looking at the text of the particular statute, Justice Thomas
looked for supporting rationale in other relevant statutes. For
example, Justice Thomas addressed the "conventional rule of civil
litigation that generally applies in Title VII cases." 29  Relying on
Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,30 Justice Thomas said that
Title VII's silence on a special evidentiary requirement suggests that
the Court should not depart from the rule requiring a plaintiff to
prove his case "by a preponderance of the evidence."" In asserting
that circumstantial evidence in discrimination cases "is not only
sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive
25. Desert Palace, 123 S. Ct. at 2153.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2153.
28. Id. at 2153-54. Finally, the Court noted that Desert Palace conceded that another
provision in the 1991 Act - Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), (Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) requires an
employer to "demonstrate[e] that [it] would have taken the same action in the absence of the
impermissible motivating factor" in order to take advantage of the statutes partial affirmative
defense), which also uses the term "demonstrates," does not impose a heightened standard
before a defendant could use the provision's partial affirmative defense. Faced with the
counterintuitive option of giving the same term in the same Act a different meaning merely
because the rights of the plaintiff and not the defendant are at issue, the Court opted to follow
the "normal rule of statutory construction," there being no congressional indication to the
contrary. Thus, the Court concluded that in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction, "a
plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice.'" Id. at 2155.
29. Id. at 2154.
30. 460 U.S. 711, 714, n.3 (1983).
31. Desert Palace, 123 S. Ct. at 2154.
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than direct evidence," the Court relied on Rogers v. Missouri Pacific
Ry. Co.,3 2 and on the common criminal court instruction that "the law
makes no distinction between the weight or value to be given to
either direct or circumstantial evidence."3 Additionally, the Court
said that neither Desert Palace nor its amici could point to any other
circumstance in which the Court has restricted a litigant to the
presentation of direct evidence absent some affirmative directive in a
statute.3 4
Notice the pattern followed by Justice Thomas. First, Justice
Thomas looks at the statutory language, focusing on the text's
ordinary meaning. Second, he considers the surrounding textual
material, what has been referred to as the "internal context proper
English" analysis." Finally, Justice Thomas expands the analysis to
include a larger group of relevant statutes passed by Congress, which
are presumed to be part of an integrated body of law.36
Absent from this analysis is any discussion of a search for
legislative intent. This alternative approach, which in the current
Court is championed most intently by Justice Stevens, "seeks
guidance from historical context, legislative history, and prior cases
identifying the purpose that motivated the legislation."3 Instead,
Justice Thomas's opinion starts and finishes with textual analysis,
leaving little room along the way for any discussion of intent.
2. Kentucky Association of Health Plans Inc. v. Miller18
An identical approach to statutory interpretation cases is
observed in Kentucky Association of Health Plans Inc. v. Miller,
where the Court considered whether Kentucky's " Any Willing
Provider" (AWP) statutes, which prohibit health benefit plans from
discriminating against providers "willing to meet the terms and
conditions for [plan] participation," are saved from preemption under
the Employment Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA).39
32. 352 U.S. 500, 508 n.17 (1957).
33. 1A KEVIN F. O'MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG, & WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL § 12.04 (5th ed. 2000).
34. Desert Palace, 123 S. Ct. at 2154.
35. See Popkin, supra note 6, at 1142.
36. Id. at 1148.
37. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 112 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
38. 123 S. Ct. 1471 (2003).
39. Id. at 1474.
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The suit was brought by health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) and a Kentucky-based association of HMOs, all of which
claimed that Kentucky's AWP statutes frustrated their efforts at cost
and quality control, and denied consumers the benefit of their cost-
reducing arrangements with providers. 4 0 The HMOs asserted that
ERISA preempts all state laws "insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan." 4' The HMOs further asserted
that Kentucky's AWP laws fall outside the scope of ERISA's savings
clause, which provides that "law[s] ... which regulat[e] insurance,
banking, or securities" are saved from preemption. 42 The district
court disagreed, however, and concluded that although both AWP
statutes "relate to" employee benefit plans under section 1144(a),
each law "regulates insurance" and is therefore saved from
preemption by section 1144(b)(2)(A).4 3
Relying on UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America v. Ward,44 the
Sixth Circuit affirmed and held that Kentucky's laws "regulat[ed]
insurance" because they were "specifically directed toward 'insurers'
and the insurance industry." 45 The Court of Appeals then considered,
as "checking points or guideposts" in its analysis, the three factors
used to determine whether the HMOs' practice fits within "the
business of health insurance." In so doing, the Sixth Circuit followed
the Supreme Court in its decisions construing section 1144(b)(2)(A),
which "relied, to varying degrees, on [the Court's] cases interpreting
the McCarran-Ferguson Act."46
The Court, in a decision written by Justice Scalia, began its
analysis by focusing on the statutory language. The HMOs contended
that Kentucky's AWP laws did not regulate insurers with respect to
an insurance practice because they focused upon the relationship
between an insurer and third-party providers - which in their view did
not constitute an insurance practice.47 The Court disagreed, stating
40. Id.
41. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000)).
42. Id. at 1474-75 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)).
43. Id. at 1474.
44. 526 U.S. 358 (1999).
45. Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, 123 S. Ct. at 1474 (internal quotations omitted).
46. Id. at 1478. "In determining whether certain practices constitute 'the business of
insurance' under the McCarran-Ferguson Act ... our cases have looked to three factors: 'first,
whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk; second,
whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the
insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry.'" Id.
(quoting Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982)) (emphasis in original).
47. In order for a state law to be "covered by § 1144(b)(2)(A), which saves laws that
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that it does not follow that a law mandating certain insurer-provider
relationships fails to "regulate insurance." 48  Kentucky's statutes,
prohibiting health insurers from discriminating against willing
provider, "regulate" insurance by imposing conditions on the right to
engage in the business of insurance. The Court stated, however, that
whether or not an HMO's contracts with providers constitute "the
business of insurance" is beside the point.49 "ERISA's savings clause
does not require that a state law regulate 'insurance companies' or
even 'the business of insurance' to be saved from pre-emption; it need
only be a 'law . . . which regulates insurance.'"'0
Justice Scalia then turned his attention to other provisions in the
statutes. The petitioners argued that the Kentucky statutes were not
"specifically directed toward" insurers because they applied to
individuals not exempt from state regulation by ERISA." According
to Justice Scalia, the petitioner's interpretation would render
superfluous the so-called "deemer clause" under ERISA.52 Thus,
Justice Scalia found support for his interpretation of the statutes by
relying, not only on the text of the provision in question, but by
placing it in the context of other ERISA provisions.
Finally, Justice Scalia discussed the preemption provision in
ERISA in the context of the other potentially relevant statute - the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. The Court noted that although its prior
ERISA preemption decisions had referred to the McCarran-Ferguson
factors, it had never held that the insurance savings clause required
analysis of those factors. The Court observed that the McCarran-
Ferguson factors were developed in cases that characterized conduct
by private actors, rather than state laws." The Court characterized the
McCarran-Ferguson factors as only "checking points" and
regulate insurance ... insurers must be regulated with respect to their insurance practices." Id.
at 1475 (quoting Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 356 (2002)) (internal
quotations omitted).
48. Id. at 1477.
49. Id. at 1479.
50. Id. at 1476 n.1. (emphasis in original).
51. Id. at 1476 n.1.
52. Id. Under the "deemer clause" an employee benefit plan covered by ERISA may not
"be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer ... or to be engaged in the business of
insurance ... for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies
[or] insurance contracts ..... §1144(b)(2)(B).
53. "ERISA's savings clause... is not concerned (as is the McCarran-Ferguson Act
provision) with how to characterize conduct undertaken by private actors, but with how to
characterize state laws in regard to what they 'regulate.'" Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, 123 S.
Ct. at 1476-77 (emphasis in original).
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"guideposts" that were used to "confirm our conclusion" that a
statute regulated insurance under section 1144(b)(2)(A).54 The Court
made "a clean break from the McCarran-Ferguson" analysis, and
announced: "[F]or a state law to be deemed a 'law .. . which
regulate[s] insurance' under § 1144(b)(2)(A), it must satisfy two
requirements. First, the state law must be specifically directed toward
entities engaged in insurance. Second, the state law must substantially
affect the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the
insured. ""
B. The Court Follows
That Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas are reading from the
same script in their approach to statutory construction should not be
surprising to any legal observer. What might be somewhat more
surprising is that the rest of the Court is following the same approach.
1. Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord"
Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord involved a denial of an
employee's disability benefits claim by his employer's ERISA-
governed employee disability benefit plan. In 1997, Nord consulted
his physician about hip and back pain, and was diagnosed as suffering
from a mild degenerative disc disease. After a week's trial on pain
medication, Nord's condition remained unimproved. Nord's doctor,
therefore, instructed him to cease work temporarily and
recommended that Nord consult an orthopedist. Nord ceased
working and submitted a claim for disability benefits under the Black
& Decker Disability Plan (Plan), an ERISA-governed employee
welfare benefit plan.
After the Plan denied the claim, Nord sought further
consideration by the plan administrator's "Group Claims Review."
During this process, Nord's doctor and treating orthopedist sent
letters and supporting documentation about Nord's condition." The
Plan then referred Nord for an independent examination by a
neurologist, who concluded that, aided by pain medication; Nord
could perform "sedentary work with some walking interruption in
54. Id. at 1479.
55. Id.
56. 123 S. Ct. 1965 (2003).
57. Id. at 1968.
58. Id.
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between."5 9 The administrator then made a final recommendation to
deny Nord's claim. Accepting the recommendation, the Plan denied
the claim and sent a notification letter to Nord.
Nord sued in federal district court "to recover benefits due to
him under the terms of his plan.,60 The district court granted
summary judgment for the Plan, concluding that the denial of Nord's
claim was not an abuse of the plan administrator's discretion.6 ' The
Ninth Circuit reversed on the ground that when making benefit
determinations, ERISA plan administrators must follow the "treating
physician rule" requiring an administrator "who rejects [the] opinion
[of a claimant's treating physician] to come forward with specific
reasons for his decision, based on substantial evidence in the
record." 62 In finding for Nord, the Ninth Circuit held that the Plan
had not provided adequate justification for rejecting opinions held by
Nord's doctors." The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of
the split among the circuits on the "propriety of judicial installation of
a treating physician rule for disability claims within ERISA's
domain." 6
In an opinion penned by Justice Ginsburg, the Court first noted
that nothing in ERISA "instruct[s] plan administrators to accord
extra respect to treating physicians' opinions." 65 The Court, therefore,
held that "courts have no warrant to require plan administrators
automatically to accord special weight to the opinions of a claimant's
physician; nor may courts impose on plan administrators a discrete
burden of explanation when they credit reliable evidence that
conflicts with a treating physician's evaluation." 6 6
Having found no support in the statutory language for the
claimant's position, the Court looked to other relevant provisions or
statutes. The Court agreed with the argument advanced by the
Department of Labor, to the extent that the Ninth Circuit had "erred
in equating ERISA and the Social Security Act." 67 In support of that
conclusion, the Court noted critical differences between the Social
59. Id.
60. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1968-69 (quoting Regula v. Delta Family-Care Disability Survivorship Plan, 266
F.3d 1130, 1139-44 (9th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotations omitted).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1970.
66. Id. at 1972.
67. Id. at 1969 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23).
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Security disability program and ERISA benefit plans that "caution
against importing a treating physician rule from the former area into
the latter." 6 8 First, the presumptions employed in the Social Security
regulations "grow out of the need to administer a large benefits
system efficiently." 69  The treating physician rule fosters uniformity
and regularity in the service of that need, the Court said. Second, in
contrast to the obligatory, nationwide Social Security program,
"[n]othing in ERISA requires employers to establish employee
benefits plans. Nor does ERISA mandate what kind of benefits
employers must provide if they choose to have such a plan."70 Under
ERISA, employers have large leeway to design disability and other
welfare plans as they see fit, the Court said.7' Finally, while Social
Security benefits are determined by measuring the claimant's
condition against a uniform set of federal criteria, "[t]he validity of a
claim under an ERISA . . . plan is . . . likely to turn ... on the
interpretation of terms in the plan at issue." 72  Thus, the Court
deferred to the Secretary of Labor's view that ERISA is best served
by "preserving the greatest flexibility possible for operating claims
processing systems consistent with a plan's prudent administration."7 1
In sum, the Court found that the treating physician rule should
not be applied in the ERISA context because the needs and
requirements of the two statutory regimes differ to such degree that
more investigation would be required to establish that routine
deference to the opinion of a claimant's treating physician would, as
the Ninth Circuit believed, "increas[e] the accuracy of disability
determinations" under ERISA plans.74 The Court found it significant
that the treating physician rule was not supported by the language of
the ERISA statute, was opposed by the United States Department of
Labor, and was conspicuously not incorporated by the Secretary of
68. Id. at 1971.
69. Id. (quoting Cleveland v. Pol'y Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 803 (1999)) (internal
quotations omitted).
70. Id. (quoting Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996)).
71. Id.
72. Id. (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)) (internal
quotations omitted).
73. Id. at 1966. The Court found that the most recent version of the Secretary of Labor's
regulations does not install a treating physician rule, despite being issued more than nine years
after the Social Security Administration codified the rule in that agency's regulations.
Moreover, the Court said, an amicus brief by the United States reflecting the position of the
Department of Labor "opposes adoption of such a rule for disability determinations under plans
covered by ERISA." Id. at 1970.
74. Id. at 1971 (quoting Regula, 266 F. 3d at 1139).
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Labor even though the Social Security Administrator had codified the
rule more than nine years before the most recent version of the
Secretary's regulations was issued.75
Absent from the Court's discussion is any reference to legislative
intent or broader social policy. The question whether routine
deference to the opinion of a claimant's treating physician would
yield more accurate disability determinations under ERISA plans is
"one the Legislature or superintending administrative agency is best
positioned to address" and one whose resolution "might be aided by
empirical investigation of the kind courts are ill equipped to
conduct," the Court reasoned.76
2. Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc.77
In Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc., the Court
considered the question whether the provision of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA)," that suit under the Act "may be
maintained ... in any Federal or State court of competent
jurisdiction," bars removal of such suit from state to federal court.
Phillip T. Breuer brought suit in state court against his former
employer alleging violations of Section 216(b) of the FLSA. 7 9 Jim's
Concrete removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a)."0 Breuer then sought an order remanding the case to state
court on the ground that removal was improper under the FLSA's
provision that an action "may be maintained" in any state court.
Breuer argued that the FLSA's provision is an express exception to
the general authorization of removal under section 1441(a). The
district court disagreed and denied Breuer's motion, yet certified the
issue for interlocutory appeal. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on the
75. Id.
76. Id. The Court so concluded despite conceding that, as compared to consultants retained
by a plan, an employee's treating physician may have a greater opportunity to know and
observe the patient as an individual. The Court also did not dispute that physicians repeatedly
retained by benefit plans may have an "incentive to make a finding of 'not disabled' in order to
save their employers money and to preserve their own consulting arrangements." Id. (quoting
Regula, 266 F.3d at 1143) (internal quotations omitted).
77. 123 S. Ct. 1882 (2003).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000).
79. Breuer, 123 S. Ct. at 1884.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000) reads, "[E]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by Act of
Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or defendants, to the district
court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending."
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ground that Congress had expressly barred removal in "direct,
unequivocal language" in other statutes, but was not comparably
prohibitory in Section 216(b)." The Supreme Court held that Breuer's
case was properly removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
Statutory language came first, according to the Court. In
delivering the Court's opinion Justice Souter noted that, because the
FLSA permits actions to be maintained in any Federal or State Court
of competent jurisdiction and the district court would have original
jurisdiction over FLSA claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337(a),
removal of FLSA actions is prohibited only if Congress expressly
provided as much. The Court first noted that "nothing on the face of
[the statute] looks like an express prohibition of removal." 3 Further,
the Court said that an ambiguous term like "maintain" cannot qualify
as an express provision as Congress has shown itself capable of
prohibiting removal in unmistakable terms in a number of other
statutes," but did not do so in the case of Section 216(b)." The Court
noted that since Congress' 1948 amendment of the removal statute,
there has been no question that whenever the subject matter of an
action qualifies for removal, the burden is on a plaintiff to find an
express exception. The Court said that Breuer's reliance on the
malleability of the term "maintain" did not satisfy his burden of
demonstrating that an express exception exists.86
C. Unanimity Under Stress
In the cases discussed above, the Court followed an astonishingly
uniform approach to interpretation. This uniformity was somewhat
fractured in two of the remaining statutory interpretation cases, and
completely shattered in the last one.
1. Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates v. Wells 7
In Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates v. Wells, the plaintiff
was terminated from her job with the defendant, a medical clinic
81. Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard Inc., 292 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2002).
82. Breuer, 123 S. Ct. at 1884.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1885 citing 29 U.S.C. §H 1445(a)-d (2000); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a), 1719 (2000); 3612
(2000)).
85. Breuer, 123 S. Ct. at 1885-86.
86. Id. at 1886.
87. 123 S. Ct. 1673 (2003).
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organized as a professional corporation under state law." Plaintiff
sued, alleging unlawful discrimination on the basis of disability under
the Americans with Disability Act (ADA). 89 The defendant moved
for summary judgment arguing that it was not an "employer" and
thus, not a "covered entity," within the meaning of the ADA because
it did not have the requisite fifteen or more employees for the twenty
weeks required by the statute.90 The basis for this argument, according
to the defendant, was that its four physician-shareholders should not
be counted as employees for purposes of determining whether the
defendant was a covered entity. Relying on the "economic realities"
test, the defendant successfully argued before the district court, that
its four physician-shareholders should be regarded as "partners" and
not as "employees" within the meaning of the ADA.9 '
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed, adopting instead what it referred to as the "literal" test. The
court was troubled by the possibility of permitting professional
corporations to secure "'the best of both possible worlds' by allowing
[a professional corporation] both to assert its corporate status
advantages and to argue that it is like a corporation in order to reap
the tax and civil liability advantages and to argue that it is like a
partnership in order to avoid liability for unlawful employment
discrimination." 9 2 The court said that "while the shareholders of a
corporation may or may not be 'employees,' they can never be
partners in that corporation because the roles are 'mutually
exclusive.'"9' The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, rejecting
the Ninth Circuit's adoption of the literal test.94
In an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, and joined by six
other justices, the Court found the literal test inconsistent with
Congress' decision to exempt small firms (i.e., firms with fewer than
fifteen employees) from the ADA, and with Congress' expectation
88. Id. at 1676.
89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000).
90. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., 123 S. Ct. at 1676. "The term 'employer' means a
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each
working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year,
and any agent of such person . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (5)(a).
91. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., 123 S. Ct. at 1676.
92. Wells v. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., 271 F.3d. 903, 905 (2d Cir. 2001)
(internal quotations omitted).
93. Id. (quoting Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 798 (2d Cir.
1968)).
94. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., 123 S. Ct. at 1681.
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that courts will fill in the gaps left as the result of congressional
silence, by referring to common law rules on the specific subject
matter.95
Having rejected the literal test, the Court adopted the EEOC's
guidelines on the issue of who is an employee and when partners
qualify as employees. The EEOC guidelines, which as the Court
noted, properly focus on the "touchstone" issue of control, identify
the following six factors:
[1.] Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual
or set the rules and regulations of the individual's work;
[2.] Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization
supervises the individual's work;
[3.] Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the
organization;
[4.] Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able
to influence the organization;
[5.] Whether the parties intended that the individual, be an
employee, as expressed in written agreements or contracts;
and
[6.] Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and
liabilities of the organization.96
In adopting the EEOC's approach, the Court noted that
neither individual job titles, nor the existence of an "employment
agreement" will be determinative, and that, "all the incidents of the
relationship" ought to be considered." The Court remanded the case
to the Ninth Circuit, noting that while several of the factors
considered under the EEOC guidelines supported the finding that the
four physician shareholders were not employees, contrary evidence
existed on the record.98
At first glance, it would appear that the court's decision in
Clackamas, written by Justice Stevens, the nemesis of the textual
approach to statutory interpretation cases, is inconsistent with the
approach followed by the Court in the other four statutory cases
discussed above. This conclusion is unwarranted, however. The
rationale is twofold. First, Justice Stevens began by acknowledging
the statute and making the point that in this case the statute was
completely useless. Justice Stevens pointed out that the ADA defines
95. Id. at 1678-79.
96. Id. at 1680-81 (quoting EEOC Compliance Manual § 605:0009).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1681.
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"employee" as "an individual employed by an employer," " indicating
that such a "nominal definition" is "completely circular and explains
nothing."',oo Thus, having found no guidance in the statutory language,
Justice Stevens was free to move to other sources to determine the
meaning of the term employee under the ADA. Second, Justice
Stevens' opinion did not open the door for unfettered judicial
discretion, the main concern of the textualist approach, since it then
relied on the interpretation by the agency to determine the outcome
of the dispute.
Both of these arguments are consistent with the textualist
approach, at least as advanced by Justice Scalia in a number of earlier
cases. Indeed, both Justices Scalia and Thomas joined Justice
Stevens' majority opinion.101
2. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Ayers 02
The same dynamics observed in Clackamas were operating in
Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Ayers. This case, better than any other
case this term, reflects the dichotomy I argue exists in the way the
current Court decides statutory, as opposed to common law, cases.
Six former employees brought suit against Norfolk & Western
Railway Co. under the Federal Employers" Liability Act (FELA).1 03
The claimants alleged that Norfolk negligently exposed them to
asbestos, which caused them to contract the occupational disease
99. Id. at 1677 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4)).
100. Id. (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992)) (internal
quotations omitted).
101. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, dissented, accusing the majority of
unnecessarily shrinking the inquiry as to who is an employee under the ADA by unduly
focusing on the issue of control in the employment relationship. Justice Ginsburg would have
found the physician-shareholders to be employees under the ADA, and thus the defendant to
be covered under the Act. The reasoning of her opinion is, however, somewhat unclear. At
first, it appears that Justice Ginsburg agreed with the majority's decision to use the common law
test. While criticizing the manner in which the common law (functional test) was applied,
Justice Ginsburg argued that a broader application - an application that did not narrowly focus
on control - would have resulted in a different outcome. Justice Ginsburg, though, then
appeared to change directions, by arguing that in deciding who is an employee under the ADA
(and arguably in other cases involving anti-discrimination laws) the courts should look at the
corporate form chosen by the employer. In a discussion more consistent with the "literal test,"
Justice Ginsburg, noted that the effect of having selected to organize the medical practice as a
corporation, was to establish a "separate and distinct" entity in order to reap the advantages of
limited liability. Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that there is "no reason to allow the
doctors to escape from their choice of corporate form when the question becomes whether they
are employees for purposes of federal antidiscrimination statutes." Id. at 1681-83 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
102. 123 S. Ct. 1210 (2003).
103. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2000).
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asbestosis." As an element of their occupational disease damages, the
claimants sought recovery for mental anguish based on their fear of
developing cancer. The trial judge instructed the jury that any
plaintiff demonstrating a reasonable fear of cancer related to proven
physical injury from asbestos is entitled to compensation for that fear
as a part of his pain and suffering damages award.os The jury
returned total damages awards for each claimant ranging from
$770,000 to $1.2 million.06 Norfolk appealed, but the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia denied discretionary review.0 o
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the following issues: (1) Whether a worker suffering from asbestosis,
who was exposed to asbestos while on the job, may recover damages
for fear of developing cancer for his asbestosis-related "pain and
suffering;" and, (2) Whether the railroad is initially entitled to
apportionment - a division of damages among injury-causing
tortfeasors, which would limit the railroad's liability to the injured
employee to a proportionate share.0 "
The latter issue, which the Court treated as a statutory
construction issue, was resolved swiftly and unanimously by the
Court. The Court held that the railroad may be held jointly and
severally liable for injuries caused in part by its own negligence, and
that the defendant has the burden of seeking contribution from other
tortfeasors.'" Under the FELA, the Court noted, "[E]very common
carrier by railroad while engaging in [interstate commerce], shall be
liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed
by such carrier in such commerce ... for such injury ... resulting in
whole or in part from the negligence of ... such carrier...."10 In
interpreting this provision, as it did in other statutory interpretation
cases, the Court first looked at the particular statutory language, and
held that the two "while" phrases ("[w]hile engaging in [interstate
commerce]" and "while he is employed by such carrier in such
commerce") should be read together to limit an employer's liability to
cases in which the injury is sustained by "railroad employees while
104. Ayers, 123 S. Ct. at 1215.
105. Id. at 1216.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1214.
109. Id. at 1225.
110. 45 U.S.C. § 51.
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the employees are themselves involved in such commerce.""' The
provision, said the Court, "does not speak to cases in which an injury
has multiple causes, some related to railroad employment and others
unrelated to that employment." 11 2 Because the asbestosis claimants
suffer an "injury," caused in whole or in part by the defendants, the
Court held that the trial court's instruction to the jury was not
erroneous."' The Court then briefly looked at the particular provision
in the context of the remainder of the statute,114 and finally in the
context of other similar disputes.115
The former issue - whether a worker suffering from asbestosis,
who was exposed to asbestos while on the job, may recover damages
for fear of developing cancer for his asbestosis-related pain and
suffering - presented a more contentious issue for the Court. In a
discussion more consistent with Professor Chemerinsky's values
choice approach than with a strict adherence to statutory text, both
the majority and dissents engaged in a policy debate regarding the
propriety of expanding the type of injuries that will trigger employer
liability.
In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that damages resulting from the
fear of developing cancer may be recovered under the FELA by a
railroad worker suffering from the actionable injury asbestosis caused
by work-related exposure to asbestos.116 The Court began its analysis
by noting that because the FELA is a federal negligence statute, the
Court was required to look to common-law principles to determine
"what injuries are compensable under the statute."117 Specifically, the
Court's precedents required application of the zone-of-danger test, a
limiting test designed to protect defendants from "the possibility of
nearly infinite and unpredictable liability.""
111. Ayers, 123 S. Ct. at 1225 (quoting The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 504
(1908)) (internal quotations omitted).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. "The statutory context bolsters our reading, for interpreting §1 to require
apportionment would put that provision in tension with the rest of the statute." Id.
115. Id. at 1226 (discussing various other FELA cases, as well as distinguishing similar
federal statutes).
116. Id. at 1215.
117. Id. at 1217.
118. Id. (quoting Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gotshall, 512 U.S. 532, 546 (1994)) (internal
quotations omitted). The zone-of-danger test "confines recovery for stand-alone emotional
distress claims to plaintiffs who: (1) sustain a physical impact as a result of a defendant's
negligent conduct; or (2) are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct - that is,
those who escaped instant physical harm, but were within the zone of danger of physical
impact." Id. (quoting Gotshall, 512 U.S. at 547-48) (internal quotations omitted).
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The zone-of-danger test was applied in the FELA context in
Metro-North Commuter Ry. Co. v. Buckley,11 in which two categories
of emotional distress claims were described: "Stand-alone emotional
distress claims not provoked by any physical injury, for which
recovery is circumscribed by the zone-of-danger test; and emotional
distress claims brought on by a physical injury, for which pain and
suffering recovery is permitted."1 20 Using Metro-North's categorical
approach, the Court said that the case at bar could not be considered
a stand-alone emotional distress claim because the claimants were not
disease and symptom free.21 The Court noted that the parties agreed
that asbestosis, an occupational disease caused by exposure to
hazardous dust, is a cognizable injury under the FELA. Since Norfolk
did not dispute that the claimants suffered from asbestosis, and given
that "common-law courts ... do permit a plaintiff who suffers from a
disease to recover for related negligently caused emotional distress," 12 2
the Court concluded that the claimants' emotional distress was
brought on by a "physical injury," and therefore recovery was not
circumscribed by the zone-of-danger test.123
Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts,24 the Court
asserted that "once found liable for 'any bodily harm,' a negligent
actor is answerable in damages for emotional disturbance 'resulting
from the bodily harm or from the conduct which causes it."'25
According to the Court, a plaintiff suffering bodily harm need not
allege physical manifestations of his or her mental anguish, provided
that such complainant prove that his or her alleged fear was genuine
d * 126and serious.
The Court rejected the defendant's argument that cancer fears
are too remote from asbestosis to be included in pain and suffering
119. 521 U.S. 424 (1997).
120. Ayers, 123 S. Ct. at 1218.
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting Metro-North Commuter R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 432 (1998))
(emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted).
123. Id.
124. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
"If the actor's negligent conduct has so caused any bodily harm to another as to make
him liable for it, the actor is also subject to liability for
(a) fright, shock, or other emotional disturbance resulting from the bodily harm or
from the conduct which causes it."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 456 (1963-1964).
125. Ayers, 123 S. Ct. at 1221-22 (emphasis in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 436(a)).
126. Id. at 1223.
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damages.'27 The defendant argued that since the asbestosis claimants
may bring a second action if cancer develops, cancer-related damages
are unwarranted in the asbestosis suit.128 In response, the Court noted
that "the asbestos claimants did not seek, and the trial court did not
allow, discrete damages for their increased risk of future cancer."
Instead, the Court said, "the claimants sought damages for their
current injury .... a present fear" that the toxic exposure which
caused the asbestosis may later cause cancer.1 29 Moreover, the Court
said, defendant's argument had a large gap because it excluded
recovery for the fear experienced by an asbestosis sufferer who never
gets cancer.13
Justice Kennedy's dissent emphasized that the Court must
endeavor "to develop a fair and workable rule of decision," bound
only by the terms of the FELA and its own precedent giving meaning
to the Act, not the majority rule or the Restatement rule.'31 In Justice
Kennedy's view, the Court has the responsibility "to adopt a rule that
reconciles the need to provide compensation for deserving claimants
with the concerns that speculative damages awards will exhaust the
resources available for recovery."13 2 Justice Kennedy argued that the
majority's decision "is not employee-protecting;" rather, it is
"employee-threatening," as "it is more likely that those with the
worst injuries from exposure to asbestos will find they are without
remedy because those with lesser ... injuries [i.e., fear of future
illness] will have exhausted the resources for payment." 13 In support
of this argument he cited a report indicating that asbestos litigation
has driven fifty-seven companies, which employed hundreds of
thousands of people, into bankruptcy.'34
Clearly, the majority and dissenters have starkly different ideas
about the policies the Court should credit in developing a federal
127. Id. at 1221.
128. Id. This position was supported by the United States as amicus curiae, which referred
to the separate disease rule, under which most courts have held that the statute of limitations
runs separately for each asbestos-related disease. Id. (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 12) (internal quotations omitted).
129. Id. (emphasis in original).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 1236 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 1230 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), Justice Breyer's dissent expressed concern with
the "legal uncertainty" of interpreting the common-law, and stated that the Court should refer
to the "underlying factors that have helped to shape related 'emotional distress' rules." Id. at
1236-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 1230 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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common-law that administers the FELA. The majority credits the
intent of Congress in enacting the FELA in 1908, which it said was to
"shif[t] part of the human overhead of doing business from employees
to their employers."135 "To further [the Act's] humanitarian
purposes," the Court said, "Congress did away with several common-
law tort defenses that had effectively barred recovery by injured
workers." 36  Following a policy of opening the way for employee
recoveries, the Court said that it "must resist pleas ... to reconfigure
established liability rules [ust] because they do not serve to abate
today's asbestos litigation crisis."1 37 Such action "defies customary
judicial administration and calls for national legislation," the Court
said.'38
The dissenters, however, did not agree that the rule the Court
adopted has been settled by the common law."'9 "The rule the
majority derives does not comport with our responsibility to develop
a federal common law that administers FELA in an effective,
principled way," Justice Kennedy argued.14' His dissent urged that a
stronger liability limiting policy is more consistent with changes
already underway in common-law rules for compensating victims of a
disease with a long latency period.141 Justice Kennedy pointed to the
crisis in asbestos litigation caused by verdicts which bankrupt
employers and deplete victim compensation funds by awarding
damages for "unrealized fear." 142 Justice Breyer argued that it would
be "perverse to apply tort law's basic compensatory objectives in a
way that compensated less serious injuries at the expense of more
serious harms."1 43 The dissenters, therefore, urged the Court to limit
liability to the worse injuries from exposure to asbestos in order to
"permit future cancer victims to recover for their injuries,... even if
that recovery comes at the expense of limiting the recovery for fear of
cancer available to those suffering some present harm. "144
135. Id. at 1217 (quoting Gotshall, 512 U.S. at 542) (internal quotations omitted).
136. Id. (quoting Gotshall, 512 U.S. at 542) (internal quotations omitted).
137. Id. at 1228.
138. Id. (quoting Oritz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999)) (internal quotations
omitted).
139. Id. at 1230 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
140. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 1233 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 1229 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 1238 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
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D. It's Just a Theory, Anyway: Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co.145
As usually happens when one tries to explain Supreme Court
decisions with an overarching jurisprudential theory, there are
exceptions. With regard to the Court's approach to statutory
interpretation cases, the oddball case is Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co.
In Barnhart, the Court faced a challenge to an agency action made
pursuant to Section 9706(a) of the Coal Industry Retiree Health
Benefit Act of 1992. Section 9706(a) provides that "the Commissioner
of Social Security shall, before October 1, 1993, assign each coal
industry retiree who is an eligible beneficiary to a signatory operator
which (or any related person with respect to which) remains in
business." 14 6 The controversy in Barnhart stemmed from the
Commissioner's assignment of beneficiaries to the respondents,
employers in the coal industry, after the statutory date. 47 Several coal
companies challenged the Commissioner's untimely assignments,
claiming that the statutory "deadline" sets a time limit on the
Commissioners authority to assign, so that a beneficiary not assigned
on October 1, 1993, must be left unassigned for life.'48 The coal
companies obtained summary judgment, and the judgment was
affirmed by the Sixth Circuit.4 9 Because the Sixth Circuit's holding
did not agree with the Fourth Circuit on the issue, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. The Court held that the
October 1, 1993, language in the statute is not a jurisdictional
deadline, and thus the Commissioner was not precluded from making
initial assignments after such date.
Had the Court followed the approach it followed in all the other
employment law statutory cases decided this term, the outcome might
have been different. This indeed, was the argument raised by both
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas in their dissenting opinions. Justice
Thomas reminded the Court, "Unless Congress explicitly states
otherwise, 'we construe a statutory term in accordance with its
145. 537 U.S. 149 (2002).
146. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9706(a) (2000) (emphasis added). A "signatory operator," as defined by
the Act, is an employer in the coal industry that has signed a coal wage agreement requiring
provision of health benefits to retirees of such employer or contributions to one of several
enumerated benefit plans. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701(b)(1), 9701 (c)(1), 9706(a) (2000). Assignment to
a signatory operator binds the operator to pay the premiums of the assigned beneficiary's
benefits. Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 153.
147. Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 152,156.
148. Id. at 156.
149. Id. at 157.
THE SUPREME COURT'S 2002 TERM
ordinary or natural meaning.'" "' According to Justice Thomas the
word "shall" must be construed as a mandatory command."' Absent
any explicit congressional directive to the contrary, the Court's
inquiry must have ended there.52
The majority, however, disregarded the approach to statutory
interpretation discussed above, and held that an initial assignment
made after October 1, 1993, is valid despite its untimeliness. Instead
of starting the discussion by focusing on the statutory language, the
Court, in an opinion by justice Souter, began by looking at other
cases, and by focusing on the elusive issue of congressional intent.
The Court began its analysis by stating that it misses the point to
argue that the October 1, 1993, date was "mandatory," "imperative,"
or a "deadline."153 The Court said that the failure to act on schedule
merely raises the real question, which is "what the consequence of
tardiness should be." The Court relied on United States v. James
Daniel Good Real Property,"4 for the proposition that "if a statute
does not specify a consequence for noncompliance with statutory
timing provisions the federal courts will not in the ordinary course
impose their own coercive sanctions.""'
Additionally, the Court said that the statute's goal of ensuring
that benefits are funded, as much as possible, by those most
responsible is best served by reading the statutory date as a spur to
prompt action, not as a bar to tardy completion.'5 6 The coal
companies, which called the Commissioners failure to observe the
time limit "jurisdictional," argued that the consequence is that the
affected beneficiaries may never be assigned, but instead must be
150. Barnhart 537 U.S. at 184 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471,
476 (1994)).
151. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
152. Justice Scalia made a similar argument. He first argued that these cases were not about
letting the Commissioner complete a little unfinished business that barely missed the deadline,
as the vast majority of late assignments were made years after the statutory deadline had passed.
Id. at 173-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He stressed that Congress never "conferred upon the
Commissioner the power that she claims - an unexpiring authority to assign retired coal miners
to signatory operators." Id. at 172 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Further, he insisted that "the scope of
an agency's power is determined by the text of the statutory grant of authority," that "the
temporal scope of the Commissioner's authority is . . . defined according to a clear and
unambiguous date," Id. at 175 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting), and that section 9706(a) "does not
establish the Court's proposition that time-limited mandates include continuing authority," id.
at 177 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 157.
154. 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
155. Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 159 (citing James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. at 63).
156. Id. at 172.
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permanent wards of the UMWA Pension Plan, the AML Fund, and,
potentially, of coal operators without prior relationships to these
beneficiaries.1 7 The Court, however, interpreted the coal companies'
argument to mean "that as to tardily assigned beneficiaries who were,
perhaps, formerly [respondents'] own employees, they go scot free."1 8
The issue and arguments framed in this way, the Court rejected as
unsupportable and counterintuitive the coal companies' argument
that the mandatory "shall" language together with a specific deadline
leaves the Commissioner with no authority to make an initial
assignment on or after October 1, 1993."' "Hence the oddity of the
claim that late official action should shift financial burdens from
otherwise responsible private purses to the public fisc, let alone
siphon money from funds set aside expressly for a different public
purpose. . ..
The coal companies argued that another textual feature of the
Act, the provision for unassigned beneficiary status, indicated
inability to assign beneficiaries after the statutory date.'61 The
companies argued that the provision for unassigned beneficiaries is a
"consequence" for failure to assign in a timely manner, that it reflects
a legislative preference for finality over accurate initial assignments,
and that it creates a right on the part of the companies to rely
permanently on the state of affairs as they were on October 1, 1993.162
In response, the Court referred to legislative history which indicates
that the "unassigned" would be true orphans, by reason that "no
operator remains in business."163 Additionally, the Court noted that
the Act's "purpose is to assure that any beneficiary, once assigned,
remains the responsibility of a particular operator, and that the
number of unassigned beneficiaries is to be kept to an absolute
157. The premiums that signatory operators are required to pay include a "health benefit
premium" a "death benefit premium," and possibly, an "unassigned beneficiaries premium." Id.
at 153-54. "Before signatory operators may be compelled to contribute for the benefit of
unassigned beneficiaries, however, funding from two other sources must run out: The United
Mine Workers of America Pension Plan (UMWA Pension Plan) ... [and] the Abandoned Mine
Land Reclamation Fund (AML Fund), established for reclamation and restoration of land and
water resources degraded by coal mining." Id. at 154 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 9705(a)(1) (2000)).
158. Id. at 158.
159. Id. at 158-59.
160. Id. at 160.
161. Id. at 163.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 165 (quoting 138 Cong. Rec. 34,003 (1992) (statements of Sen. Wallop)) (internal
quotations omitted).
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minimum."'6 Thus, the Court said that Congress did not consider
"that the category of the 'unassigned' would include beneficiaries, let
alone a lot of beneficiaries, who could be connected with an operator,
albeit late."'6  The Court said that the better inference is that this is
nothing more than a case for which Congress made no provision.1 6
Referring again to legislative history, the Court noted that the
statute is "designed to allocate the greatest number of beneficiaries in
the Plans to a prior responsible operator."'67 Thus, the Court
concluded that it could not read the Act as jurisdictional because "it
would allocate not the greatest, but the least number of beneficiaries
to a responsible operator."' The way to reach the congressional
objective, the Court said, "is to read the statutory date as a spur to
prompt action, not as a bar to tardy completion of the business of
ensuring that benefits are funded, as much as possible, by those
identified by Congress as principally responsible." 16
III. THE FMLA: NEVADA DEPT. OF HUMAN RESOURCES V. HIBBS 7
No one jurisprudential theory completely explains every decision
issued by the Court, and as the Court's decision in Barnhart v.
Peabody Coal Co. illustrates, this maxim holds true even when one
limits the analysis to only one type of decision, in our case
employment law decisions involving matters of statutory construction.
The slim chances of having one unifying theory grow even slimmer
when one broadens the analysis to include other types of cases. This
section discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Nevada Dept. of
Human Resources v. Hibbs, dealing with the constitutionality of the
Family and Medical Leave Act. Unlike the statutory interpretation
cases discussed above, the Court's decision in Hibbs does not fit into
any one specific framework. Perhaps as Professor Chemerinsky has
argued, "value choices" are all that we are left as a possible
explanation.
In Hibbs, respondent, William Hibbs, sought damages and
injunctive relief to enforce his alleged rights under the Family and
164. Id.
165. Id. at 166.
166. Id. at 169.
167. Id. at 171-72 (quoting 138 Cong. Rec. 34,001 (1992)) (internal quotations omitted).
168. Id. at 172.
169. Id.
170. 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003).
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Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA).1 7 ' Hibbs was a state employee
of the Nevada Department of Human Resources (Department) who
sought leave to care for his ailing wife, who was recovering from a car
accident and neck surgery.17' The Department granted his request for
twelve weeks of FMLA leave and authorized him to use the leave
intermittently as needed between May and December 1997.
Eventually, the Department informed Hibbs that he had exhausted
his FMLA leave, that no further leave would be granted, and that he
must report back to work. Hibbs was terminated after failing to
return to work by the specified date.
The district court awarded the Department summary judgment
on the grounds that the FMLA claim was barred by the Eleventh
Amendment and that respondent's Fourteenth Amendment rights
had not been violated. Hibbs appealed, and the United States
intervened to defend the validity of the FMLA's application to the
states. The Ninth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve a split among the courts of appeals on the
question whether an individual may sue a State for money damages in
federal court under the FMLA.
Affirming the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court, in a decision
penned by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that employees of the State
of Nevada may recover money damages in the event of the State's
failure to comply with the family-care provision of the Act.1' The
Court's decision was based on precedents interpreting section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment,'7 4 which authorize Congress to abrogate the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity if it makes its intention to do
so "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute and acts
pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment."'7 The Court said the Act clearly authorizes
suits against public employers.' Thus, the only issue was whether
Congress acted within its constitutional authority under section 5, "to
171. 29 U.S.C. §H 2601-2654 (2000).
172. Id. at 1977.
173. Id.
174. "Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5.
175. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1977.
176. "The Act enables employees to seek damages 'against any employer (including a public
agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction,' 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2), and
Congress has defined 'public agency' to include both 'the government of a State or political
subdivision thereof' and 'any agency of... a State, or a political subdivision of a State.' [29
U.S.C.] §§ 203(x), 2611(4)(A)(iii)." Id.
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enforce" the substantive guarantees of section 1 - among them, equal
protection of the laws - by enacting "appropriate legislation.", 77
Relying on City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court said that section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress authority to enact
so-called prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially
constitutional conduct in order to remedy and to deter
unconstitutional conduct that undermines the substantive guarantees
of section 1 of that Amendment.17 9 The Court also relied on Kimel v.
Florida Board of Regents,'80 for the proposition that section 5
legislation reaching beyond the scope of section 1's actual guarantees
must be an appropriate remedy for identified constitutional
violations, and not an attempt to substantively redefine the states'
legal obligations."' These precedents, the Court stated, require that
the test set forth in City of Boerne be applied to distinguish
appropriate prophylactic legislation from substantive redefinition of
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, valid section 5 legislation
must exhibit "congruence and proportionality between the injury to
be prevented or remedied and the means adapted to that end." 182
Applying this test, the Court held that the evidence Congress had
before it of the states' record of unconstitutional participation in, and
fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the administration of
leave benefits was "weighty enough to justify the enactment of
prophylactic § 5 legislation. "18' The Court further held that Congress'
chosen remedy, the family-care leave provision of the FMLA, is
"congruent and proportional to the targeted violation." 84
In reaching its judgment, the Court defined the right at issue
under the FMLA as "the right to be free from gender-based
discrimination in the workplace."' 85 The Court then noted that state
gender discrimination triggers a heightened level of scrutiny beyond
the rational basis review the Court applies to age- and disability-
based claims."" The Court said that it is more difficult to justify
177. Id.
178. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
179. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1977.
180. 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000).
181. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1977-78.
182. Id. (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520) (internal quotations omitted).
183. Id. at 1981.
184. Id. at 1982 (quoting Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374
(2001)) (internal quotations omitted).
185. Id. at 1978.
186. Id. at 1982.
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gender-based classifications, which must "serve important
governmental objectives" and be "substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives," and, therefore, "it was easier for
Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations."187
The Court noted that Congress had evidence before it that States
"had continued to rely on invalid gender stereotypes in the
administration of leave benefits."188 Specifically, Congress considered
a 1990 Bureau of Labor Statistics survey which stated that 37 percent
of surveyed private-sector employees were covered by maternity
leave policies, while only 18 percent were covered by paternity leave
policies.189 The Court also noted a fifty-state survey which
demonstrated that the proportion and construction of leave policies
available to public sector employees differed little from those offered
to private sector employees.190 The Court, therefore, endorsed the
conclusion that "differential leave policies for men and women were
not attributable to any differential physical needs of men and women,
but rather to the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family
members is women's work." 9' The Court also noted that Congress
had evidence that even where state laws and policies were not facially
discriminatory they were applied in discriminatory ways.1 92 The Court
held that because of the persistence of such unconstitutional
discrimination by the States, Congress was justified in enacting the
FMLA as remedial legislation.1 93
In holding that the FMLA is a congruent and proportional
remedy, the Court first noted that Congress had tried unsuccessfully
to address the problem of unconstitutional gender discrimination
through Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.1 94 Under
Kimel, the Court had said, such problems may justify added
prophylactic legislation. Second, the Court asserted that Congress'
chosen remedy "is narrowly targeted at the fault line between work
187. Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)) (internal quotations
omitted).
188. Id. at 1979.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1979 n.3.
191. Id. at 1979.
192. Id. at 1980. Congress was "aware of the 'serious problems with the discretionary nature
of family leave,' because when 'the authority to grant leave and to arrange the length of that
leave rests with individual supervisors,' it leaves 'employees open to discretionary and possibly
unequal treatment.'" Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 103-8, pt. 2, at 10-11 (1993).
193. Id. at 1979.
194. Id. at 1982.
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and family - precisely where sex-based overgeneralization has been
and remains strongest - and affects only one aspect of the
employment relationship. "19 Third, the Court was further assured of
the validity of the FMLA because of the limitations of its remedial
scheme.9 Thus, the Court concluded, the FMLA is "congruent and
proportional to its remedial object, and can 'be understood as
responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior." 9 '
In sum, the Court held that the FMLA is a valid abrogation of
states' immunity from suit because Congress acted within its
constitutional authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Therefore, employees of the State of Nevada may
recover money damages in the event of the state's failure to comply
with the family-care provision of the Act.
In dissent, Justice Kennedy framed the issue as whether the
States can be subjected, without consent, to suits brought by private
persons seeking to collect moneys from the state treasury.1 98 Arguing
that the states' "immunity cannot be abrogated without
documentation of a pattern of unconstitutional acts by the States,"a
Justice Kennedy noted that " [t]he paucity of evidence to support the
case the Court tries to make demonstrates that Congress was not
responding with a congruent and proportional remedy to a perceived
course of unconstitutional conduct." Justice Kennedy reminded the
Court of its duty to "separate permissible exercises of congressional
power from instances where Congress seeks to enact a substantive
entitlement under the guise of its § 5 authority."20 ' In concluding that
Congress enacted a substantive entitlement program, Justice
Kennedy insisted that "Congress did not 'act to accomplish the
legitimate end of enforcing judicially recognized Fourteenth
Amendment rights, but instead pursued an object outside the scope
of Section Five by imposing new non-remedial legal obligations on
195. Id. at 1983.
196. "Congress chose a middle ground, a period long enough to serve the needs of families
but not so long that it would upset the legitimate interests of employers. Moreover, the cause of
action under the FMLA is a restricted one: The damages recoverable are strictly defined and
measured by actual monetary losses and the accrual period for back pay is limited by the Act's
2-year statute of limitations." Id. at 1984. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
197. Id. (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532).
198. Id. at 1986 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 1994 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 1992 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 1993 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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the States.' ,202
Justice Scalia went further in dissent, arguing that the
sovereignty of one State cannot "be abridged under Section 5 because
of violations of another State, or by most other States, or even by 49
other States." 203  Nevada is entitled in an as-applied challenge "to
assert that the mere facts that (1) it is a State, and (2) some States are
bad actors, is not enough; it can demand that it be shown to have
been acting in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. "20
What does Hibbs tell us about the Court's approach in deciding
this type of case, as compared to the statutory cases discussed
earlier? 205 Is there a jurisprudential theory explaining the outcome in
Hibbs? Before Hibbs, when deciding whose unconstitutional conduct
Congress was allowed to consider when deciding whether to establish
a section 5 remedy, the Court had required Congress to show a
demonstrated record of state-level violations, 206 and had also reminded
Congress that section 5 remedies could only be applied to "the State
where the evil found by Congress existed." 207 The Court has also
imposed strict requirements on the type and detail of the evidence
used by Congress in documenting unconstitutional behavior by the
states. For example, in Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v.
Garrett, the Court required Congress to show that states have
engaged in discrimination against individuals with a disability in the
employment context, not in other areas, such as zoning ordinances.208
Similarly, in prior cases the Court had required detailed illustrations
of State unconstitutional conduct.2 09
In Hibbs, the Court appears to ignore all these requirements. As
Justice Kennedy pointed out, there was little evidence that states, as
opposed to private sector employers, were engaged in family leave
discrimination.210 At best eleven states were identified as having
engaged in unconstitutional conduct, and still, as Justice Scalia
pointed out, the Court attributed discriminatory conduct to all other
202. Id. at 1994 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 1985 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 1986 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
205. See Vikram David Amar, The New "New Federalism " 6 GREEN BAG 2D 349 (2003);
Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 367.
206. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369.
207. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626-27 (2000).
208. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369.
209. See e.g., City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531; Kimel v. Florida Bd. Of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000).
210. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1987 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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states.2 1' Finally, to the extent that discrimination by states was
proven, it was with regard to the allocation of parental, as opposed to
family leave, weakening the Court's argument that Congress has
acted in a congruent and proportional manner in enacting the
FMLA. 212
The Chief Justice attempted to reconcile Hibbs with prior case
law on the basis that in enacting the FMLA Congress was dealing
with gender discrimination. Classifications by government based on
gender are considered "suspect" and thus subject to a heightened
standard of review, since they implicate the core of the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, concluded Chief
Justice Rehnquist, "Because the standard for demonstrating the
constitutionality of a gender-based classification is more difficult to
meet than our rational-basis test ... it was easier for Congress to
show a pattern of state constitutional violations [in the case of the
FMLA]."
It is not clear, however, what is the relevance of the Chief
Justice's argument. The key questions in prior section 5 cases were
how often were states violating the Fourteenth Amendment, and how
tailored was Congress' response?213 That Congress was addressing
gender discrimination through the FMLA, tells us nothing about the
frequency of unconstitutional conduct by the states.214
Observers of the Court have raised doubts about the validity of
the Chief Justice's attempt to reconcile Hibbs with prior cases, and
have proposed alternative explanations. One account suggests that
given that Justice O'Connor was likely to abandon the conservative
majority on federalism issues, because of her concerns with women's
rights and discrimination issues, the Chief Justice crossed over as well
to be able to control the writing of the opinion, which otherwise
would have gone to Justice Stevens. 2 15 The New York Times' Linda
Greenhouse advanced an alternative theory. In a recent article, she
questioned the Chief Justice's "solicitude for the usefulness of the
211. Id. at 1980-81 & nn.6-9.
212. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1979.
213. See Amar, supra note 205, at 353.
214. Id.
215. See Jon D. Bible & Donald Sanders, Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs: Is
the Supreme Court Backtracking on State Sovereign Immunity?, 54 LAB. L. J. 153, 165 (2003)
(citing Edward Lazarus, A Single Day's Decisions Illustrate Deep Fault Lines In the Supreme
Court, at <http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/lazarus/20030612.html> (June 12, 2003)). Lazarus
is a former Supreme Court law clerk and author of CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPic STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1998).
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FMLA in erasing the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for
family members is women's work." 2 16 The article suggested that this
new-found interest might have something to do with the Chief
Justice's family situation: when his daughter experienced childcare
problems, the Chief Justice often "left work early to pick up his
granddaughters from school." 217
It is hard, to reconcile the holding in Hibbs with the other most
recent Court decisions in this area. As one commentator has noted in
reference to the Hibbs decision: "Ralph Waldo Emerson is quoted for
having said: 'Foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds.' That
is one criticism the current Court is scrupulously avoiding."2 18 While
the decision clearly shows that the "Court's receptiveness to
federalism arguments has limits, and that there are instances in which
even the five pro-federalism justices will rule in favor of federal
power,"219 it is less clear how those limits are determined.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Professor Chemerinsky notes that understanding constitutional
cases requires us to look at the two Justices in the middle of the
political spectrum - Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy - since
these Justices' votes are determinative in most cases. He concludes
his analysis by branding the current Court as "O'Connor's Court."
Whose court is this regarding employment law cases?
While frequently writing for the Court, particularly in 5-4 cases,
neither Justice O'Connor, nor Justice Kennedy wrote any of the
employment law majority opinions in this term. Indeed, Justice
O'Connor only wrote a short concurring opinion in Desert Palace,
while Justice Kennedy penned a dissenting opinion regarding one of
the issues discussed in Norfolk.
Justice Scalia's influence in the approach the Court follows in
deciding employment law cases, reveals the important role he plays in
this area. It is somewhat astonishing that a Court that is considered
to be so ideologically divided, was able to achieve such a remarkable
degree of unanimity in employment law cases. Of the eight cases
reviewed in this article, four were decided without dissent and three
216. See Linda Greenhouse, Heartfelt Words from the Rehnquist Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,
2003, at § 4 p. 3.
217. Id.
218. See Amar, supra note 205, at 351 (footnotes omitted).
219. See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 375.
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others by a comfortable margin. This near perfect unanimity is
remarkable given the fact that, substantively, the outcome of the
cases is not necessarily consistent with the liberal/conservative
preferences one would expect from the members of the Court. The
outcomes in the four 9-0 employment law cases decided by the Court
were evenly divided: Desert Palace and Kentucky Association of
Health Plans favor plaintiffs/employees, while Black & Decker and
Breuer favor defendants/employers.
The fact that the Court showed such a high degree of unanimity
in the statutory cases might be attributable to the approach that the
Court appears to have adopted in deciding those cases. Unlike,
constitutional law cases, for which no clear overarching theory
appears to exist,2 20 and where the Justices have allowed themselves a
free decision-making hand, in statutory interpretation cases, the
Justices' chosen approach appears to be outcome determinative.
Arguably by convincing the Court to follow the text- and rule-based
approach in deciding statutory cases, Justice Scalia has accomplished
his objective of limiting the role of judicial review, making the
decisions more likely to be a function of process, as opposed to value
choices. So maybe, in employment cases, and paraphrasing Professor
Chemerinsky, "for better or worse, this really is the" Scalia Court.
220. See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 368.
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